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The use of ﬁnancial incentives for changing health-related behaviours raises concerns regarding their
potential to undermine the processing of risks associated with incentivised behaviours. Uncertainty
remains about the validity of such concerns. This web-based experiment assessed the impact of ﬁnancial
incentives on i) willingness to take a pill with side-effects; ii) the time spent viewing risk-information
and iii) risk-information processing, assessed by perceived-risk of taking the pill and knowledge of its
side-effects. It further assesses whether effects are moderated by limiting cognitive capacity. Two-
hundred and seventy-ﬁve UK-based university staff and students were recruited online under the pre-
text of being screened for a ﬁctitious drug-trial. Participants were randomised to the offer of different
compensation levels for taking a ﬁctitious pill (£0; £25; £1000) and the presence or absence of a cognitive
load task (presentation of ﬁve digits for later recall). Willingness to take the pill increased with the offer
of £1000 (84% vs. 67%; OR 3.66, CI 95% 1.27e10.6), but not with the offer of £25 (79% vs. 67%; OR 1.68, CI
95% 0.71e4.01). Risk-information processing was unaffected by the offer of incentives. The time spent
viewing the risk-information was affected by the offer of incentives, an effect moderated by cognitive
load: Without load, time increased with the value of incentives (£1000:M ¼ 304.4sec vs. £0:M ¼ 37.8sec,
p < 0.001; £25: M ¼ 66.6sec vs. £0: M ¼ 37.8sec, p < 0.001). Under load, time decreased with the offer of
incentives (£1000: M ¼ 48.9sec vs. £0: M ¼ 132.7sec, p < 0.001; £25: M ¼ 60.9sec vs. £0: M ¼ 132.7sec,
p < 0.001), but did not differ between the two incentivised groups (p ¼ 1.00). This study ﬁnds no evi-
dence to suggest incentives “crowd out” risk-information processing. On the contrary, incentives appear
to signal risk, an effect, however, which disappears under cognitive load. Although these ﬁndings require
replication, they highlight the need to maximise cognitive capacity when presenting information about
incentivised health-related behaviours.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Financial incentives are increasingly being considered and used
in health policies in the UK and elsewhere, in an attempt to improve
health-related behaviours (Le Grand, 2008; Marteau, Ashcroft, &
Oliver, 2009). They have been used most often in low and middleHealth Psychology Section,
SE1 9RT, UK. Fax: þ44 (0)
tm388@medschl.cam.ac.uk
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY licenseincome countries as part of programmes which aim to reduce
poverty and health inequalities. These programmes use conditional
cash transfers that are delivered to families, if certain health and
educational behaviours have been performed (Lagarde, Haines, &
Palmer, 2007). They have also been used in high-income coun-
tries to target some health behaviours, including tobacco use, un-
healthy eating and lack of physical activity (e.g. APMHealth Europe,
2007; North East Essex NHS Trust, 2009), as well as poor man-
agement of chronic conditions (e.g. Claassen, Fakhoury, Ford, &
Priebe, 2007; World Bank, 2008). Most ﬁnancial incentive
schemes involve the offer of a reward, such as a cash payment, a
voucher or a prize, which is delivered if a pre-speciﬁed behaviour or
outcome has been achieved. Other schemes involve the use of a
‘deposit-contract’ whereby individuals pledge their own money,
which they lose if they fail to meet their goals..
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iours, the use of ﬁnancial incentives raises particular concerns
regarding their potentially adverse effects on the quality of people’s
decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours. This is particularly
relevant to behaviours associated with adverse side-effects, such as
taking certain medicines, receiving immunisation, and attending
screening appointments. The speciﬁc concern is that the prospect
of receiving a ﬁnancial reward could result in the risks associated
with an incentivised health behaviour being overlooked (Marteau
et al., 2009). There are two possible ways this could occur: ﬁrst,
ﬁnancial incentives might lead people to ignore or not process risk-
information; second, people offered ﬁnancial incentives might
process risk- information but might not feel that it applies to them,
and therefore continue to perceive the risks to themselves as low
compared to those not offered incentives. Results from a recent
randomised controlled trial, in which teenage girls were offered
shopping vouchers worth £45 (V56; $73) for undergoing three
doses of the HPV vaccination, did not ﬁnd the offer of ﬁnancial
incentives to undermine the quality of people’s decisions to engage
in an incentivised health-related behaviour (Mantzari, Vogt, &
Marteau, in press). These conclusions were based on an assess-
ment of girls’ ability to make informed choices, as measured by
their attitudes towards the HPV vaccination and their knowledge of
the HPV vaccination’s consequences on health. Knowledge of the
vaccination’s adverse side-effects was not assessed. Consequently,
ﬁndings do not allow inferences to be made about whether or not
the offer of a ﬁnancial reward results in the risks associated with
the incentivised behaviour being overlooked (Marteau et al., 2009).
We are unaware of any studies that have assessed the impact of
ﬁnancial incentives on the processing of risk-information associ-
ated with an incentivised health-related behaviour. Research
within two conceptually analogous domains could help elucidate
the uncertainty. The ﬁrst involves the use of payments for live or-
gan donations, which have been criticised for undermining donors’
ability to calculate the related risks (e.g. Becker & Elias, 2007;
Olbrisch, Benedict, Haller, & Levenson, 2001). Partial support for
this claim derives from studies investigating the economic and
health consequences of selling kidneys in India (Goyal, Mehta,
Schneiderman, & Sehgal, 2002) and Pakistan (Naqvi, Ali, Mazhar,
Zafar, & Rizvi, 2007). Findings show that the majority of vendors
were very poor and sold their organs to pay off debts, but would not
recommend others to do the same. This could be taken as an
indication of regret and interpreted as sellers having been unaware
of the negative consequences associated with organ donation. It is
not clear, however, whether that was because they were inade-
quately informed of the likely outcomes or because the prospect of
money led them to ignore the risks or perceive them as not being
applicable to them. Recent research shows that as the risk of renal
failure increases, individuals become less willing to donate kidneys,
regardless of the level of payment offered, therefore suggesting that
ﬁnancial incentives do not blind people to the risks of living kidney
donation (Halpern et al., 2010).
The second related research area involves the use of ﬁnancial
incentives for participation in research, including clinical trials.
Payments increase individuals’ willingness to participate in
research (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Singer, Groves, & Corning, 1999;
Slomka, McCurdy, Ratliff, Timpson, & Williams, 2007). They have,
however, been criticised for being undue inducements (Dickert &
Grady, 1999) that alter decision-making processes, such that the
side-effects of participating are not fully considered (Dickert,
Emanuel, & Grady, 2002), and risks are overlooked (Grant &
Sugarman, 2004; London, 2005), thus leading individuals to
expose themselves unwittingly to the possibility of harm (McNeill,
1997). These concerns are largely hypothetical with the evidence
about how participation payments inﬂuence perceived risk anddecision-making processes being scarce. The few studies that have
been conducted in the area suggest that compensation does not
lead people to neglect research risks (Bentley & Thacker, 2004;
Dunn, Kim, Fellows, & Palmer, 2009; Halpern, Karlawish, Casarett,
Berlin, & Asch, 2004; Singer & Couper, 2008). Speciﬁcally, it has
been found that people make rational trade-offs between risk and
beneﬁt. Although they are willing to accept more risk in return for
more money, this does not blind them to risk or distort their
judgments (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Dunn et al., 2009; Halpern
et al., 2004; Singer & Couper, 2008). On the contrary, participa-
tion payments could signal risk and increase vigilance and infor-
mation seeking when the amount offered is high. In one study,
participants were allocated to view information regarding either a
trial that involved drawing blood or a trial that involved Trans-
cranial Magnetic Stimulation and were offered either $25, $100 or
$1000 for participation. Findings showed that compared to the low-
payment scenarios, the offer of a high payment (i.e. $1000)
increased participants’willingness to participate, but also increased
perceived risk and the time they spent viewing the risk-informa-
tion (Cryder, London, Volpp, & Loewenstein, 2010).
Although the above ﬁndings highlight some of the potential
effects of ﬁnancial incentives on the processing of risk-informa-
tion, certain limitations associated with the design of the studies
do not allow ﬁrm conclusions to be drawn. These include ﬁrst, a
failure to incorporate conditions of no payment, which prevents
an assessment of the absolute effect of ﬁnancial incentives on risk-
information processing; second a lack of measures of individuals’
knowledge of risks. It has been suggested that when motivated by
cash payments, individuals may have less interest in assessing or
comprehending study details, reading consent forms or attempt-
ing to understand the research aims and related risks (Grady,
2005). Accordingly, an assessment of the impact of ﬁnancial in-
centives on individuals’ knowledge of risks is essential. A third
limitation of existing studies stems from the reliance on hypo-
thetical scenarios, of which participants were aware. Only one
study (Cryder et al., 2010) led individuals to believe that they were
responding to information of an actual trial, in which they could
participate.
In addition to the above, to our knowledge no studies have
assessed the potential role of limited cognitive capacity on the
impact of ﬁnancial incentives on risk-information processing. In
real-life situations, the cognitive resources of some people invited
to decide about engaging in incentivised behaviours are often
overloaded with matters of daily living. Cognitive capacity can also
be affected by the way in which information (e.g. the design and
format) about the potential adverse consequences of incentivised
health-related behaviours is given, which could overload working
memory, thus inducing cognitive load and reducing the amount of
cognitive resources available for processing the informational
content (Chandler & Sweller, 1991; Sweller, 1994; Sweller, Van
Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998). Consistent with the assumptions of
“dual-processing” models of decision-making (e.g. Strack &
Deutsch, 2004), ﬁndings demonstrate that cognitive load inhibits
activation of the reﬂective system that generates behavioural de-
cisions based on reasoning, judgment and knowledge about facts
and values and increases activation of the impulsive system that
elicits behaviour through associative links (Hinson, Jameson, &
Whitney, 2002; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Consequently, under
cognitive load, people have less ability to process risks and rely on
heuristics to make satisfactory decisions with minimal effort
(Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2009; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese,
Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; Whitney, Rinehart, & Hinson, 2008). From
this it seems possible that the potential adverse effects of ﬁnancial
incentives on risk-information processing are ampliﬁed under
conditions of cognitive load.
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addition to the above shortcomings, further research is needed,
particularly experiments, to illuminate the mechanisms by which
ﬁnancial incentives inﬂuence people’s decision-making mecha-
nisms, including the processing of risk-information.
The present study
The aim of this study was to assess the impact of ﬁnancial in-
centives on the quality of decisions to consume medicine with po-
tential side-effects. This speciﬁc context was chosen because
ﬁnancial incentives have been used to improve medication compli-
ance (e.g. DeFulio et al., 2012; Hill & Ramachandran, 1992; Morisky
et al., 2001; Pilote et al., 1996; Sorensen et al., 2007; Volpp et al.,
2008), yet their impact on the processing of side-effects associated
with most medicines has thus far remained unstudied.
The study speciﬁcally evaluates the impact of low-value (£25)
and high-value ﬁnancial incentives (£1000) on i) willingness to
consume a pill with side-effects, ii) the time spent viewing the pill-
related information, and iii) risk-information processing, as
assessed by a) the level of perceived risk associatedwith consuming
the pill and b) knowledge of its side-effects. These speciﬁc incentive
values were chosen to model the low and high value incentives
used by Cryder et al. (2010) (i.e. $25 and $1000), which is the only
other study we are aware of which led individuals to believe that
they were responding to information of an actual trial, in which
they could participate. The study further assesses the extent to
which any effects are moderated by cognitive load.
Hypotheses
1) The offer of ﬁnancial incentives increases the proportion of in-
dividuals who are willing to take the pill.
2) The offer of a low-value ﬁnancial incentive does not increase the
time spent viewing the pill-related information compared to no
incentive.
3) The offer of a high-value ﬁnancial incentive increases the time
spent viewing the pill-related information compared to no
incentive.Table 1
Demographic characteristics of study participants.
Characteristic No incentives (n ¼ 86) £25 (n ¼ 99)
No load (n ¼ 43) Load (n ¼ 43) No load (n ¼ 4
Mean age yrs (sd) 24.4 (8.07) 23.9 (5.16) 25.7 (7.32)
Gender
Male 44% 49% 41%
Female 56% 51% 59%
Ethnicity
White 49% 63% 58%
Mixed 9% 2% 5%
Asian 37% 28% 27%
Black 2% 5% 10%
Occupation
Student 74% 74% 68%
Employed full-time 14% 16% 19%
Employed part-time 0% 5% 2%
Unemployed 7% 2% 5%
Education
A-levels 14% 12% 15%
Working towards degree 30% 28% 24%
Completed degree 21% 12% 17%
Working towards postgrad 21% 32% 24%
Completed postgrad 14% 14% 17%
Relationship
Single 37% 60% 49%
In relationship 37% 26% 32%
Married 16% 2% 12%4) The offer of a low-value incentive does not affect risk-
information processing.
5) The offer of a high-value incentive affects risk-information
processing.
6) The impacts of ﬁnancial incentives on the time-spent viewing
risk information and risk-information processing are ampliﬁed
under conditions of cognitive load.
Methods
Design and overview
The present study is a web-based experiment. Participants were
recruited online under the pretext of being screened for a ﬁctitious
trial examining the impact of a new cognitive-enhancing pill on
memory. Using a 3  2 factorial design, participants were rando-
mised to view webpages including the offer of different levels of
ﬁnancial incentives for taking the ﬁctitious pill (no incentive; £25;
£1000) and the presence or absence of a task intended to induce
cognitive load.
Participants
Participants comprised two-hundred and seventy-ﬁve (n¼ 275)
staff, students and alumni of universities based in London, UK.
Table 1 presents participants’ demographic characteristics. Their
mean agewas 25.3 years, ranging from 18 to 56 years and 52% were
female. The majority was White (59%), with 29% classiﬁed as Asian
and 5% as Black. Most participants were students (75%), working
towards a ﬁrst or second degree, 17.5% were in full-time or part-
time employment and 6% were unemployed or homemakers.
Recruitment and randomisation
Participants were recruited online through circular emails sent
to the contacts of a large participant database held by the Behav-
ioural Research Lab at the London School of Economics, and to the
staff and students of two schools (School of Law and School of Arts
and Humanities) of King’s College London, UK. The emails informed£1000 (n ¼ 90) Total (n ¼ 275)
1) Load (n ¼ 58) No load (n ¼ 43) Load (n ¼ 47)
23.9 (7.00) 26.7 (9.74) 25.2 (8.19) 25.0 (7.43)
44% 51% 55% 48%
55% 49% 45% 52%
52% 67% 66% 59%
7% 0% 4% 5%
36% 21% 23% 29%
2% 5% 6% 5%
79% 79% 74% 75%
7% 16% 15% 15%
5% 2% 4% 3%
3% 0% 0% 6%
19% 14% 17% 15%
28% 32% 21% 27%
14% 9% 13% 14%
24% 20% 30% 25%
12% 23% 17% 16%
64% 44% 59% 52%
21% 32% 28% 29%
7% 14% 9% 10%
E. Mantzari et al. / Social Science & Medicine 106 (2014) 75e8278participants of the existence of a ﬁctitious trial assessing the impact
of a new cognitive-enhancing pill on memory. Interested in-
dividuals were invited to complete the ﬁctitious trial’s eligibility
screening process, by clicking on a link contained within the email,
which led to the study website. They were informed that they
would receive a shopping voucher worth £10 for completing the
screening process. Upon clicking the link, participants were rand-
omised to view one of six webpages, differing in the level of in-
centives offered for consuming the ﬁctitious pill (reimbursement of
travel expenses; reimbursement of travel expenses plus £25; or
reimbursement of travel expenses plus £1000) and the inclusion or
exclusion of a task intended to induce cognitive load. The task
consisted of the presentation of a ﬁve-digit number, which par-
ticipants had to remember and recall at a later stage during the
study. The randomisation resulted in six study groups.
Measures
Willingness to take the pill
Willingness to take the ﬁctitious pill was assessed by requesting
participants to specify whether they wished to participate in the
ﬁctitious trial. They chose one of four available options: a) yes
deﬁnitely; b) yes, probably, but I would like to discuss further with a
member of the research team; c) no, probably not, but I would like to
discuss further with a member of the research team; d) no, deﬁnitely
not. Because consumption of the pill was described as the central
component of the ﬁctitious trial, willingness to participate was
considered equivalent to afﬁrmative disposition to taking the pill.
Time spent viewing risk-information
The time participants remained on the webpage presenting the
pill-related information was recorded in milliseconds.
Risk-information processing
Perceived risk. Perceived risk associated with taking the ﬁctitious
pill was measured using a questionnaire consisting of:
i) two items assessing the perceived likelihood of experiencing any
or all of the pill’s side-effects, rated on a ﬁve-point scale ranging
from 1: extremely unlikely to 5: extremely likely.
ii) two items assessing the perceived severity of experiencing any or
all of the pill’s side-effects, rated on a ﬁve-point scale ranging
from 1: extremely good to 5: extremely bad.
Average perceived likelihood and perceived severity scores were
multiplied to obtain perceived risk scores.
Knowledge of side-effects. Knowledge of the pill’s side effects was
measures in three ways:
i) participants were requested to freely recall as many of the
pill’s side effects as they could and to indicate wherever
possible, whether these were described in the pill-related
information as “very common”, “common” or “uncommon”.
One point was scored for every correctly listed side-effect.
Another point was given if the side-effect was accompa-
nied by a correct description of its frequency. Scores ranged
from 0 to 24.
ii) participants were requested to choose from a list of possible
side-effects the ones that were described in the related in-
formation as requiring medical attention. The possible op-
tions were: a) skin rash; b) fast heartbeat; c) speech
problems; d) psychiatric reactions; and e) memory loss. The
correct answers were (a) and (d) and participants were
scored one point for correctly choosing each. Selection of alloptions was taken as an indication of participants’ guessing
and resulted in one point being deducted. Scores ranged
from 0 to 2.
iii) participants were presented with six situations for which
they were required to specify whether the pill should be
taken with caution or should not be taken at all. The situa-
tions were: a) pregnant and/or breastfeedingwomen (should
not be taken); b) people with high blood pressure (should
not be taken); c) peoplewith liver problems (should be taken
with caution); d) people with irregular heartbeats (arrhyth-
mias) (should not be taken); e) people with a history of
mental health problems (should be taken with caution); f)
people with a history of substance abuse (should be taken
with caution); Participants were scored one point for each
correct speciﬁcation. Scores ranged from 0 to 6.
To obtain an aggregated measure of knowledge, scores from the
three measures were added together. Aggregated scores ranged
from 0 to 32. (Cronbach’s alpha ¼ 0.44).
Procedure
Upon entering the study website, all individuals were presented
with information about the ﬁctitious trial, including its aim, which
they were told was to assess the immediate impact of a new
analeptic drug called Modagil, on non-sleep deprived individuals’
performance on memory-related tasks. Participants were informed
that the ﬁctitious screening process would involve completion of a
series of questionnaires and would result in receipt of a £10
Amazon voucher. They were further informed that completion of
the trial would involve visiting a lab, taking a single dose (one pill)
of the drug and completing a number of simple memory-related
tasks. Participants also read information regarding their compen-
sation for taking part in the trial, which differed according to the
group to which they had been allocated (travel expenses; travel
expenses and £25; travel expenses and £1000). The subsequent
webpage presented participants with information about the ﬁcti-
tious drug Modagil, including its approved and off-label uses, its
side-effects, including information about those which require
medical attention, and its counter-indications. Although Modagil is
not a real drug, most of the information used in the study was
modelled on the actual drug Modaﬁnil. A ﬁctitious name was
chosen to prevent participants who could not recall the pill’s side-
effects from ﬁnding relevant information on the internet, in order
to complete the measures of knowledge. It was conﬁrmed that
searching the internet for the term “Modagil” would only yield
information regarding the trademarking registration for this brand
by a pharmaceutical company. This was considered appropriate, as
it would potentially reinforce participants’ belief in the credibility
of the ﬁctitious drug. Informed consent was provided by all par-
ticipants via the next webpage. Participants allocated to the groups
exposed to the cognitive load task subsequently viewed a webpage
presenting them with ﬁve randomly selected digits, which they
were instructed to memorise for later recollection. This “cognitive
load” manipulation has been used previously (Hinson, Jameson, &
Whitney, 2003; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Whitney et al., 2008). In
the next webpage participants were requested to complete a
questionnaire assessing demographic variables such as age, gender,
level of education and occupation. Subsequently, they were
required to complete the measures of perceived risk and knowl-
edge of the pill’s side effects and were asked to specify their will-
ingness to take part in the ﬁctitious trial. To prevent participants
from re-visiting the pill-related information in order to complete
the measures of knowledge, the ‘back’ function of the website was
disabled. Upon completion of all the measures, participants were
E. Mantzari et al. / Social Science & Medicine 106 (2014) 75e82 79debriefed and informed of the true aims of the study. The studywas
approved by the London School of Economics Research Ethics
Committee, Reference Number 203/26.06.2012.
Statistical analysis
To increase power, responses regarding participants’willingness
to take the pill were collapsed to create two outcomes: Yes and No.
Time and knowledge scores were log-transformed to correct for
their non-normal distribution. To assess the effects of ﬁnancial
incentives and cognitive load onwillingness to take the pill, logistic
regression analysis was conducted. To assess the effects of ﬁnancial
incentives and the moderating role of cognitive load on the time
spent viewing the pill-related information, perceived risk and
knowledge of the pill’s side-effects, univariate analyses of variance
were conducted for each outcome variable separately. Due to the
low Cronbach’s alpha between items assessing knowledge, the ef-
fects of the independent variables on each component of the
knowledge scale was also assessed. Where analyses revealed sig-
niﬁcant interactions between the two independent variables, these
were explored using simple main effects analyses and pairwise
comparisons. Obtained p-values were adjusted for the number of
comparisons using the Bonferroni correction. All tests were
assessed at the 5% level of signiﬁcance.
Power calculations
Given the £10 expense associated with each participant, the
total sample size of 275 individuals was determined by the avail-
ability of resources. Post hoc analyses using GPower 3.1 revealed
that the study had 80% power to detect a small effect (d ¼ 0.18) at
the 5% signiﬁcance level between groups on outcomes subjected to
univariate analysis of variance, i.e. those relating to the time-spent
viewing risk-related information, perceived risk, and knowledge.
Based on the ﬁndings of Cryder et al. (2010) relating to an average
proportion of 17% of participants offered £25 being willing to
participate in the trial (the study did not include a ‘no incentive’
control group), the present study also had 80% power to detect a
minimum difference in willingness to take the pill of 18% between
groups at the 5% statistical signiﬁcance level using a two-tailed
c2 test.
Results
All groups were comparable in demographic characteristics
(age, gender, education, occupation, ethnicity) (Tables 1 and 2).
Willingness to take the pill
The offer of £1000 increased the proportion of participants who
werewilling to take the pill (84% vs. 67%; OR 3.66, CI 95% 1.27e10.6,
p ¼ 0.02). The offer of £25 did not signiﬁcantly increase the pro-
portion of individuals who were willing to take the pill (OR 1.68, CITable 2












70% (30) 65% (28) 67% (58) 83% (34)
Time (sec) (sd) 37.77 (29.97) 132.7 (137.1) 85.24 (109.6) 66.59 (39.57)
Perceived risk (sd) 9.95 (4.15) 9.46 (4.92) 9.70 (4.53) 8.10 (3.26)
Knowledge (sd) 12.9 (5.90) 12.5 (5.90) 12.7 (5.87) 13.5 (6.37)95% 0.71e4.01, p ¼ 0.24). Cognitive load did not affect participants’
willingness to take the pill (OR 1.24, CI 95% 0.50e3.05, p¼ 0.65) nor
did it moderate the impact of ﬁnancial incentives on willingness to
take the pill (Interaction between offer of £1000 and cognitive load:
OR 0.46, CI 95% 0.11e1.95, p¼ 0.29; Interaction between offer of £25
and cognitive load: OR 1.25, CI 95% 0.32e4.85, p ¼ 0.75).
Time spent viewing risk-information
The offer of ﬁnancial incentives had a signiﬁcant impact on the
time spent viewing risk-information, F (2, 270) ¼ 7.14, p < 0.001.
This effect was moderated by cognitive load, F(2, 270) ¼ 35.4,
p < 0.001. The effect of incentive level was signiﬁcant both in the
absence of cognitive load, F(2, 270) ¼ 33.1, p < 0.001, and in its
presence, F (2,270) ¼ 9.18, p < 0.001. Under no load, participants
offered £1000 for taking the pill spent longer time viewing the pill
information (M ¼ 304.4 s) compared both to those not offered in-
centives (M ¼ 37.8sec), p < 0.001, and those offered £25
(M ¼ 66.6sec) p < 0.001. Those offered £25 also spent more time
viewing the information compared to those not offered incentives,
p < 0.001. Under load, those offered both £1000 (M ¼ 48.9sec) and
£25 (M ¼ 60.9sec) spent less time viewing the information
compared to those not offered incentives (M ¼ 132.7sec), p < 0.001
(for both comparisons). There was no signiﬁcant difference be-
tween the two incentivised groups, p ¼ 1.00. Among those not
offered incentives, time increased in the presence of load
(M ¼ 132.7sec) compared to its absence (M ¼ 37.5sec), p < 0.001.
The opposite pattern was observed for those offered £1000 (no
load: M ¼ 304.4sec; load: 48.9), p < 0.001. For those offered £25,
there was no difference in time in the absence (M ¼ 66.6sec) and
presence of cognitive load (load: M ¼ 60.9sec), p ¼ 0.13.
Risk information processing
Perceived risk
The perceived risk associatedwith taking the pill was unaffected
by the offer of ﬁnancial incentives, F (2, 275)¼ 2.61, p ¼ 0.70. It was
also unaffected by cognitive load, F (1, 275) ¼ 1.71, p ¼ 0.19.
Cognitive load did not moderate the impact of ﬁnancial incentives
on perceived risk, F (2, 275) ¼ 0.2.08, p ¼ 0.13.
Knowledge of the side-effects
Knowledge of the pill’s side-effects was unaffected by the offer
of ﬁnancial incentives, F (2, 259) ¼ 0.15, p ¼ 0.86. It was also un-
affected by cognitive load, F (1, 259)¼ 0.02, p¼ 0.52. Cognitive load
did not moderate time impact of ﬁnancial incentives on knowledge
of the pill’s side-effects, F (2,259) ¼ 0.12, p ¼ 0.47. Each component
of knowledge was also unaffected by the offer of ﬁnancial in-
centives (Free recall: F (2, 252) ¼ 1.36, p ¼ 0.26; Knowledge of side-
effects requiring medical attention: F (2, 250) ¼ 1.96, p ¼ 0.14;
Knowledge of counter-indications: F (2, 265) ¼ 1.65, p ¼ 0.19) and
cognitive load (Free recall: F (1, 252) ¼ 1.59, p ¼ 0.21; Knowledge of
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8.58 (3.77) 8.38 (3.56) 9.91 (4.45) 7.99 (3.43) 8.90 (4.04)
12.1 (5.30) 12.7 (5.79) 12.4 (7.04) 11.7 (4.90) 12.0 (5.73)
E. Mantzari et al. / Social Science & Medicine 106 (2014) 75e8280Knowledge of counter-indications: (F (2, 265) ¼ 0.15, p ¼ 0.70), as
well as the interaction between ﬁnancial incentives and cognitive
load (Free recall: F (2, 252) ¼ 2.15, p ¼ 0.12; Knowledge of side-
effects requiring medical attention: (F (2, 250) ¼ 1.04, p ¼ 0.36;
Knowledge of counter-indications: (F (2, 265) ¼ 0.92, p ¼ 0.40).
Discussion
The offer of £1000 increased the proportion of participants who
were willing to take the pill, but the offer of £25 did not. The offer of
an incentive did not “crowd out” the processing of risk-information:
levels of perceived risk associated with taking the pill and knowl-
edge of its side-effects did not differ between groups. Cognitive load
did notmoderate the impact of ﬁnancial incentives onwillingness to
take the pill or processing of risk-information. The time spent
viewing the pill-related information was affected by the offer of
ﬁnancial incentives, an effect moderated by cognitive load: In the
absence of load, time increased with the value of incentives, with
those offered £1000 spending the longest time viewing the infor-
mation. Under load, the offer of ﬁnancial incentives reduced viewing
time, with both those offered £25 and £1000 spending less time
viewing the information compared to those not offered incentives.
The positive impact of offering £1000 on willingness to take the
pill is consistent with predictions and previous research showing
that higher payments increase willingness to participate in clinical
trials compared to lower payments (Bentley & Thacker, 2004;
Cryder et al., 2010; Halpern et al., 2004). Although the offer of
£25 increased the proportion of individuals willing to take the pill
by 12% (95%CI ¼ 2%e25%) compared to those not offered in-
centives, this differencewas not found to be signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding
is contrary to predictions, as well as research showing that in-
centives as low as £3 ($5) can increase medication compliance (e.g.
Bock, Sales, Rogers, & DeVoe, 2001; Chernew et al., 2008; Volpp
et al., 2008). This result appears most likely due to a lack of sta-
tistical power to detect such an effect. Indeed, post-hoc analyses
revealed that the study was powered to detect a minimum differ-
ence in willingness to take the pill of 18%. The difference, however,
between those offered £25 and those not offered incentives was
smaller.
Although the offer of £1000 increased participants’ willingness
to take the pill, it did not do so by leading them to overlook the
related risks. Contrary to existing concerns (Dickert et al., 2002;
Dickert & Grady, 1999; Grady, 2005; Grant & Sugarman, 2004;
London, 2005; Marteau et al., 2009), ﬁnancial incentives in this
study did not undermine risk-information processing. This is
consistent with previous research showing that in hypothetical
situations, although people are willing to accept more risk in return
for more money, this does not blind them to risk or distort their
judgments (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Dunn et al., 2009; Halpern
et al., 2004, 2010; Singer & Couper, 2008). On the contrary, large
offers of compensation have been suggested to signal risk (Cryder
et al., 2010; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) and have been shown
by Cryder et al. (2010) to increase information-seeking, as well as
perceived risk. Similarly, in the absence of cognitive load those
offered large incentives in the present study spent the longest time
viewing the risk-information. Most importantly, results from this
study also show that even small incentives can signal risk, as
indicated by an increase in the time spent viewing risk-information
in the absence of cognitive load by those offered £25 compared to
those not offered incentives. Contrary to the ﬁndings of Cryder et al.
(2010), however, no effect was observed on perceived risk in the
current study. This apparently conﬂicting result might reﬂect the
use of different measures of perceived risk by the two studies (i.e.
judgements about a medical procedure’s riskiness in comparison to
other risky activities vs. personal perceived risk associated withconsuming the pill). Alternatively, it might represent the different
levels of riskiness associated with the procedures in which partic-
ipants were requested to engage in each of the studies (Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation vs. taking a pill with relatively mild side-
effects). This would imply that individuals do not simply equate
large incentives with riskiness in an automatic way, but might
perceive them as an indication of the need to pay more attention to
risk-information. Whether or not this increased vigilance leads to
increased levels of perceived risk may depend on the actual riski-
ness of the related procedures.
In the absence of cognitive load, the offer of large incentives
resulted in the greatest increase in the time spent viewing the risk-
information, but contrary to predictions, this was not accompanied
by an increase in knowledge of the pill’s side effects. This raises the
question of what people were doing during the additional time
they viewed the pill information. There are two possible answers.
First, based on the assumption that large payments signal more
risk, it is possible that those in the high-incentive group used the
additional time to examine the information more carefully for
anything that could be alarming, but did not pay additional atten-
tion to information they did not perceive as risky. According to this
possibility, large incentives would increase knowledge of severe
side-effects, rather than of all side-effects in general. As the varia-
tion of side-effect severity in the present study was not particularly
large, this assumption cannot be tested. Alternatively, it is possible
that the lack of differences in knowledge was the result of a ceiling
effect. Perhaps the chosen side-effects were particularly easy to
remember. Indeed some, such as headache and dizziness, are
commonly associated with many medications. Consistent with this
assumption, knowledge levels in this study were fairly high in all
groups, regardless of the difﬁculty of the free-recall measure used.
Consequently, perhaps the additional time participants spent on
the pill-information failed to increase knowledge because they had
reached the limits of their working memory capacity.
Consistent with the aforementioned notion that incentives are
not equated with risk in an automatic way is the ﬁnding that under
cognitive load the signalling effect of incentives eimplied by
increased time spent viewing risk-informatione disappeared. In
fact, in the presence of cognitive load, those offered £1000 spent the
least amount of time viewing the pill-related information. It ap-
pears that when cognitive resources are limited, the offer of in-
centives, especially large ones, can undermine risk-information
seeking, perhaps due to the activation of more automatic processes,
which narrow individuals focus; more automatic processing has
been linked to limited cognitive resources (Hinson et al., 2002; Shiv
& Fedorikhin, 1999). However, contrary to previous suggestions
that people have less ability to process risks under cognitive load
(Friese et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2008; Whitney et al., 2008) in
the present study, the decreased time spent viewing risk-
information under conditions of cognitive load by those offered
incentives did not undermine risk-information processing.
The ﬁndings from the present study add to the evidence which
challenges existing concerns regarding the adverse impact of
ﬁnancial incentives on the processing of risk-information associ-
ated with incentivised behaviours. In fact, results suggest that in-
centives, especially large ones, signal the need for increased
attention towards risk-information. Results further suggest that
under conditions of cognitive load this signalling effect disappears.
As cognitive load is affected by the design and format of informa-
tion and instructions (Chandler & Sweller, 1991; Sweller, 1994;
Sweller et al., 1998), the ﬁndings highlight the importance of pre-
senting information about incentivised health-related behaviours
and their consequences in a way that maximises cognitive capacity,
in order to preserve the signalling effect of incentives and avoid a
possible narrowing of attention.
E. Mantzari et al. / Social Science & Medicine 106 (2014) 75e82 81Certain limitations associated with the current study, however,
compromise the validity and generalisability of the conclusions
that can be drawn. In addition to the aforementioned issues
relating to the use of potentially easy-to-remember side-effects and
the limited variation in side-effect severity, the present study has
other methodological limitations. The ﬁrst relates to the possible
discrepancy between willingness to take the pill and actual
behaviour. Although the majority of participants were willing to
take the pill, it is not known how many would actually do so.
Second, although measures were taken to ensure that the trial
appeared credible, it is possible that some participants may have
realised its ﬁctitious nature, which could have inﬂuenced their
responses. As perceived credibility of the trial was not measured,
the extent to which this occurred is unknown. The third limitation
relates to the generalisabilty of the results. The majority of partic-
ipants consisted of students registered with research databases
who were potentially accustomed to taking part in experiments
and may therefore have been more suspicious than the general
population. We do not know if similar ﬁndings will be obtained
with a patient population offered payments to take a medicine.
Furthermore, cognitive load information consisted of a 5-digit
number rather than information relevant to the medication. It
should also be highlighted that the sample size of the study was
determined by available resources rather than power calculations.
As such, the analysis of the full 3  2 factorial design was possibly
underpowered in that group sizes were generally under n ¼ 50.
In conclusion, the ﬁndings from the present study provide no
evidence to support the concerns regarding the adverse effects of
ﬁnancial incentives on risk-information processing and the quality
of decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours. Low value in-
centives do not “crowd out” risk-information processing or affect
willingness to perform incentivised behaviours. Although large-
value incentives increase willingness to engage in incentivised
behaviours, their offer signals more risk. This signalling effect dis-
appears when the cognitive capacity to process information is
reduced, highlighting the need to maximise cognitive capacity
when presenting information about an incentivised health-related
behaviour. Despite the many strengths of the study, these ﬁndings
require replication in future research that will overcome its
limitations.
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